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“The Road Goes on Forever And the Party Never Ends”1: 
A Response to Judge Tacoma’s Prescription 
for a Return to Foster Care “Limbo” and 
“Drift”
?
Wexford County Probate Judge Kenneth Tacoma 
has written a thought-provoking article that brings 
attention to a very real problem: the excessive number 
of youth who are permanent wards but who have no 
realistic hope for adoption or other permanent plan. 
We should all thank him for encouraging a serious 
discussion about what to do about this problem. But 
the Judge’s prescription for addressing this important 
consequence of current child welfare law is ultimately 
by Frank E. Vandervort, JD
unconvincing. If his suggestions are followed—and 
it appears that they have been taken seriously by the 
Michigan Supreme Court, which quietly convened a 
task force to look into making recommendations for 
policy changes as a result of Judge Tacoma’s con-
cerns—Michigan would most likely return to the days 
of foster care “limbo” and foster care “drift.” 
We haven’t heard those terms much for the past 
two decades, but it would be wise for our policy mak-
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ers to investigate and ensure that they fully understand 
them and their implications before forging ahead with 
Judge Tacoma’s proposals. Judge Tacoma mentions, in 
passing, the concept of “limbo” but does not describe 
the very real problem it presented to children stuck in 
a foster care system that would not make a decision. 
He fails to even mention the problem of “drift,” which 
was closely associated with the idea of “limbo.” Much 
discussed in the 1970s, foster care “limbo” described 
the temporary status of foster children in the days 
before the enactment of the Adoption Assistance and 
Child Welfare Act of 1980, the federal government’s 
fi rst legislative eff ort to reform the nation’s foster care 
system. “Drift,” was used to describe the phenomenon 
of children moving from foster home to foster home 
or “drifting” through the system. Cleary, these phe-
nomena still exist, but if Judge Tacoma’s recommenda-
tions become law, they will be the offi  cial policy of the 
state of Michigan. 
Th is article responds to Judge Tacoma’s suggested 
changes in Michigan law. It begins with a very brief 
history of child welfare legislation at the federal and 
state levels. Next, it points out a number of errors in 
Judge Tacoma’s understanding of the current state of 
Michigan’s child welfare law.2 It is necessary to point 
out these errors because it seems that his misstate-
ments of the law form the foundation for his recom-
mended reforms. Th en it will respond point-by-point 
to many of Judge Tacoma’s recommendations. Finally, 
I will off er several suggestions for addressing the prob-
lem of legal orphans that do not require legislative or 
policy changes, but would require that we make signif-
icant changes in the way child welfare law is practiced 
in this state. 
A Brief History
Child welfare is an area of the law that seems to 
have been particularly vulnerable to pendulum swings 
as policymakers have tried to develop a set of rules 
to address an infi nite variety of exceedingly complex 
problems of human functioning. Before 1980, children 
entered the foster care system and very often there they 
stayed. Stayed, that is, until they were someday released 
from foster care on their own. Perhaps at some point 
they were returned to the custody of their natural par-
ents, but there was no requirement that they were to be 
returned or that an alternative permanent plan be made 
for them, and state law diff ered widely on these issues. 
Children routinely spent their entire childhoods 
in “temporary” foster care. For example, in 1977 the 
United States Supreme Court decided Smith v Orga-
nization for Foster Families for Equality and Reform,3 
in which it was called on to delineate the constitu-
tional rights of foster parents who had parented foster 
children for many years. Th e children at issue in that 
case had lived with their foster parents for as long as 
10 years. Similarly, Santosky v Kramer,4 in which the 
Supreme Court addressed the standard of evidence 
required by the constitution before a parent’s rights 
could be terminated, involved three children. One en-
tered foster care in November 1973, the other two in 
about September 1974. Th e state moved to terminate 
parental rights for the fi rst time in September 1976, 
but the trial court rejected the state’s eff ort. Th e state 
again sought termination of parental rights in October 
1978. Such long stays in “temporary” foster care were 
not at all unusual in those days. 
If these long stays in foster care were not bad 
enough, children were frequently moved from fos-
ter home to foster home. Our current child welfare 
system still struggles with stability. But in those days, 
before the federal government stepped in with fi nan-
cial incentives to stop the practice, many states moved 
children as a matter of policy whenever they grew 
emotionally close to their foster parents. 
In response to children’s long stays in the uncer-
tainty of temporary foster care, the federal government 
enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare 
Act of 1980 (AACWA). Th e AACWA established a 
funding scheme that sought to achieve three main 
goals: 1) reducing the numbers of children entering 
foster care by mandating that “reasonable eff orts” 
be made to prevent the removal of children from 
their natural parents’ custody; 2) the expediting of 
children’s movement through the foster care system by, 
among other things, requiring states to make “reason-
able eff orts” to reunify children with their natural 
parents and establishing a requirement of permanency 
planning hearings after the child had been in care for 
18 months; and 3) providing federal funding assis-
tance to encourage adoption of those children who 
could not be returned home. 
In response to the AACWA, in 1988 Michigan 
overhauled its Juvenile Code. Th ose revisions were 
based on the fi ndings of the Coleman Commission, 
which was chaired by then Supreme Court Justice 
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Mary Coleman, and were commonly referred to as the 
Stabenow legislation for then-State Senator Debbie 
Stabenow, the primary sponsor of the reform legisla-
tion. Among other things, the Stabenow reforms 
required “reasonable eff orts” before children could be 
removed from their homes and, once removed, before 
the court could terminate parental rights. Th at legisla-
tion led Michigan to establish Families First and simi-
lar programs in an eff ort to preserve families and stem 
the tide of children entering the foster care system.
Th e Stabenow reforms—as was the federal law—
were widely misunderstood. It became the typical 
interpretation that every conceivable eff ort to prevent 
foster placement or to reunify a family had to be 
made. As a result, many children were harmed by the 
reluctance to remove them from abusive and neglect-
ful parents. On the national level, the case of Joshua 
DeShaney, a 4-year-old boy who was severely beaten 
and brain damaged at the hands of his father while 
the state’s child welfare workers took notes, is but one 
example of the way family preservation programs were 
misused.5 Some children died.6 
Many more children remained stuck in foster care 
“limbo” despite eff orts to move them through the fos-
ter care system and either back home to their parents 
or on to alternative permanent homes. In 1998, in In 
re Sherman,7 a panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals 
expressed its exasperation with the slowness of child 
welfare proceedings in this way:
[T]he basic facts and procedural history of this 
matter are part and parcel of the sadly familiar 
litany of parental neglect and failure, substance 
abuse, behavioral problems, and tortuous and 
prolonged legal proceedings that so often char-
acterize parental rights termination cases. At 
the outset of such cases, one may well wonder 
whether the state is justifi ed in proposing the 
ominously fi nal step of terminating parental 
rights; at the conclusion, one can only wonder 
what took so long.
 
Because it believed its intent in enacting the 
AACWA was misunderstood, in 1997 Congress 
enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA). 
Broadly speaking, ASFA had the same three goals 
as the AACWA: to reduce the number of children 
entering foster care, to move children who are in the 
system into permanent homes in a timeframe that is 
consistent with children’s developmental needs, and to 
promote the adoption of children from the foster care 
system. Additionally, Congress sought to clarify its 
intention with regard to the application of the “rea-
sonable eff orts” requirement making explicit that the 
interests of children in safety and permanency are the 
system’s paramount considerations.8 ASFA was signed 
into law in late 1997, and the fi rst wave of the Bins-
feld legislation was signed into law in December of 
that year; a second package of bills was signed into law 
by the governor in December of 1998. With Binsfeld, 
Michigan met or, in some cases, accelerated the ASFA 
timelines. 
With only minor variations, this is where our law 
stands today. 
Misunderstanding the Law
Before turning to the policy recommendations 
Judge Tacoma suggests, it is necessary to address the 
misunderstandings of the law refl ected in his article. 
In a very fundamental way, his article communicates 
a misunderstanding of Michigan law as it relates to 
termination of parental rights, which leads to faulty 
conclusions about how to address the problem of legal 
orphans. 
 Permanency Planning Hearings After One Year
Judge Tacoma fi rst asserts that the “one-year rule” 
contained in Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19a con-
tributes to the excessive use of termination of paren-
tal rights. Th e operative provision of Section 19a is 
subparagraph 5. He argues that this provision of the 
law makes termination of parental rights “the default 
option” and “the mandated case plan if a child remains 
in foster care for one year after initial placement.”9 
But a careful analysis of the most salient portions 
of that provision demonstrates that this is not the case 
at all. Th e fi rst sentence of subsection (5) reads: “If 
parental rights to the child have not been terminated 
and the court determines at a permanency planning 
hearing that the return of the child to his or her par-
ent would not cause a substantial risk of harm to the 
child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being, the 
court shall order the child returned to his or her par-
ent.” Clearly, then, the preference articulated in the 
statute is not a default to termination, but the pre-
cise opposite, a default for return of the child to the 
parent’s custody unless the court fi nds a “substantial 
risk of harm” exists. 
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In a child protection case that reaches the stage 
that 19b(5) applies, the parent will have been shown 
to have abused or neglected the child. He or she will 
have been given as much as a year to engage in services 
aimed at assisting the parent to regain custody. Yet 
despite these eff orts, the court must still fi nd that the 
child would be at a “substantial risk of harm” before 
the court may take any action other than returning 
the child to parental custody. So, after having been 
at least once victimized by the parent and forced to 
uproot his or her life to live with relatives or strangers 
and waiting around for a period of time that might be 
his or her entire life, at the end of one year, the child 
shoulders the risk of harm unless that risk is deemed 
“substantial” by the court. Th is seems a more than fair 
eff ort to balance the interests of parents with those of 
their children.10 
Th e statute goes on in an eff ort to level this shoul-
dering of the burden. It provides: “In determining 
whether the return of the child would cause a substan-
tial risk of harm to the child, the court shall view the 
failure of the parent to substantially comply with the 
terms and conditions of the case service plan . . . as 
evidence that return of the child to his or her parent 
would cause a substantial risk of harm to the child’s 
life, physical health, or mental well-being.” Th at is, 
unless the parent has made real and consistent eff orts 
to improve his or her parenting capacity—which was 
previously found to be below the minimum acceptable 
level after the application of full due process proce-
dures—the law will assume that the parent contin-
ues to be unfi t. Where the parent has “substantially 
complied,” he or she has produced evidence that she is 
no longer unfi t to parent the child.11 Th is assumption 
that a parent who has not complied with the ordered 
services continues to be unfi t seems more than reason-
able given the large amount of assistance off ered to the 
parent in the form of various treatment programs and 
casework services. 
It is unfortunately true that some parents—per-
haps many more than we are willing to admit—are 
simply incapable of being helped, regardless of how 
much assistance they are provided, in anything like a 
reasonable time when we take into consideration the 
needs of their children.12 Anyone who has done child 
welfare work for any length of time has likely been in-
volved in a case in which a parent with long-standing 
mental health problems (which may include numer-
ous psychiatric hospitalizations), or a serious substance 
abuse problem, insists on residing with a partner who 
abuses both her and her children. 
Th ese cases are often complicated by the pres-
ence of poverty. And this co-morbidity is routinely 
encountered in child welfare practice. How can we 
possibly untangle such a knot in a year—or two or 
three years for that matter? And what should we do 
with the children of these families while their parents 
struggle with their problems? We cannot simply place 
children into a state of suspended animation. Th ey 
grow; they develop attachments to other adults; to 
ensure their well-being, children need a stable primary 
attachment fi gure and a sense of long-term stability. 
While our child welfare system too often falls short of 
our goal that children have a stable family life within a 
reasonable time, taking into consideration the par-
ticular child’s developmental needs, enacting many of 
Judge Tacoma’s suggestions into law would make these 
unfortunate outcomes the offi  cial policy of the state, a 
policy that has been tried and that demonstrably does 
not serve the interests of children. 
Of course, the application of the “one-year rule” 
doesn’t really mean that children must wait only a 
year for permanency or that parents are off ered only 
one year of services in an eff ort to regain custody of 
their children. If we assume that the child has been 
in care for one year and the court holds the required 
permanency planning hearing at that time, neither 
the child’s hunt for permanency nor the obligation 
to provide services to the parent is done. Th e child 
welfare road is long, and the child has only just begun 
his journey.
Th e Trejo case provides a convenient example for 
understanding how the system actually works. In 
Trejo, after the parent rejected the agency’s eff orts to 
preserve her family, the agency fi led a petition and the 
trial court held a preliminary hearing on May 2, 1995. 
Th e court authorized the petition and ordered the 
children removed from parental custody. Later that 
month, the parents entered a plea. Th e children were 
initially placed with relatives and were replaced into 
foster homes in October 1995. Th e court held vari-
ous review hearings. A permanency planning hearing 
(PPH) was held June 12, 1996, more than 13 months 
after they were removed from parental custody. It took 
another month, until July 12, 1996, for the agency to 
actually fi le the termination petition, this was actually 
expeditious because under the law the agency has 42 
days to fi le if ordered to do so at the PPH.13 Th e court 
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held numerous days of hearings on the petition, but 
not until December 2, 1996, did the court enter its 
order actually terminating parental rights.
Th ese timeframes are not at all atypical, particularly 
in our more urban jurisdictions where the vast majority 
of this state’s child welfare cases are heard. As this case 
demonstrates, the so-called “one-year rule” can regularly 
stretch to 18 months or two years. Th e Trejo children’s 
search for a permanent home wasn’t, of course, over at 
that point. Th e appeals began. In Trejo, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals issued its opinion affi  rming the termi-
nation of parental rights on June 12, 1998, a year-and-
a-half after the termination. Fortunately, due to steps 
to expedite these cases, it currently takes about a year 
for a child welfare case to be decided by the Michigan 
Court of Appeals. Th e kids remain in “limbo” while 
this process takes place.14 Th e Michigan Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Trejo on July 5, 2000, some fi ve 
years and two months after the Trejo children’s saga of 
“temporary” foster care placement began. 
Clearly the “one year rule” doesn’t mean a year for 
the children involved. It most often means substan-
tially more, and it may mean their entire lifetime!
Judge Tacoma laments that the “one-year rule” 
requires a movement in the direction of termination 
“even if other options (such as continued work with 
the parent(s) on a case service plan, long-term foster 
care or long-term relative placement) might be avail-
able for consideration.” I will address each of these 
three options in turn. 
First, the mere fact that the statute may require in 
some cases that the agency pursue termination after 
one year from the child’s entry into the system, does 
not mean that services stop at that point. Indeed, 
Michigan law seems to require that services continue 
until the court actually terminates parental rights. 
Th e Juvenile Code requires the court to put in place 
a treatment plan as part of the dispositional order.15 
Th e statute also presumes that those services will be 
provided until the court actually terminates parental 
rights.16 So, “continued work with the parent(s)” after 
the fi ling of the termination petition is built into the 
current scheme for termination of parental rights.
Second, regarding long-term foster care, Judge 
Tacoma expresses concern that the court has too few 
options for using this means as an alternative to termi-
nation of parental rights. I disagree. 
Th e Juvenile Code specifi cally grants the court 
substantial authority to extend foster care placement 
when doing so will serve a child’s interests: 
If the court determines that it is in the child’s 
best interests based upon compelling reasons, 
the child’s placement in foster care may con-
tinue on a long-term basis. 17
Th is language is designed to comport with the 
language of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(ASFA).18 ASFA generally requires the state to pursue 
termination of parental rights when a child has been in 
foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.19 Th e 
federal statute, however, provides three broad excep-
tions to this requirement: 1) where the child is being 
cared for by a relative, 2) where a “compelling reason” 
has been documented that fi ling a petition to terminate 
parental rights “would not be in the best interests of 
the child,”20 and 3) where the state has not provided 
adequate services to meet the reasonable eff orts require-
ment. Moreover, ASFA specifi cally grants state courts 
broad authority to take whatever action would serve 
the child’s interests in individual cases, without suff er-
ing any negative federal funding consequences, even if 
the state’s child welfare agency does not agree with the 
action. Th us, 42 U.S.C. § 678 provides: 
Nothing in this part [Title IV-E of the social se-
curity act] shall be construed as precluding the 
State courts from exercising their discretion to 
protect the health and safety of children in in-
dividual cases, including cases other than those 
described in section 671(a)(15)(D).21 
Moreover, Michigan’s Juvenile Code specifi cally 
provides for permanent foster family placement when 
that placement would serve the interests of a child 
who is 14 years of age or older.22 A child who is placed 
pursuant to a permanent foster family agreement 
remains under the court’s jurisdiction, and the court 
must conduct review hearings at six-month intervals.23 
Plainly, the permanent foster family agreement provi-
sion establishes, for some children, that foster care is a 
permanent placement. Used wisely, these various pro-
visions of law provide the court with broad discretion 
to maintain a child in a foster home or other non-rela-
tive foster care placement. 
Judge Tacoma’s third concern has to do with inad-
equate statutory authorization to use long-term rela-
tive placement when doing so would serve the child’s 
interests. Again, I disagree. 
As already noted, if the child is placed with a 
relative, ASFA does not mandate that the Depart-
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ment of Human Services fi le a termination petition, 
even where the child has been in foster care for 15 of 
the most recent 22 months,24 and it grants the court 
broad decision-making authority with regard to the 
child’s placement.25 So there is no federal funding pro-
hibition against the extension of “temporary” place-
ment with a relative. 
Michigan law is consistent with the federal law. 
Th e Juvenile Code, court rules,26 and Department 
of Human Services policy27 all strongly favor rela-
tive placement. Moreover, the legislature has recently 
expanded the defi nition of a “relative” to open addi-
tional placement resources for children.28
In the appropriate case, the court has the authority 
to grant legal guardianship to a relative or to another 
adult whom the court determines can provide ade-
quately for the child.29 To ensure maximum fl exibility 
in ensuring the child’s safety, the statute specifi cally 
permits the court to dismiss the child protection 
proceeding when guardianship has been granted or to 
keep the child protection proceeding open.30 
Even if a case is not resolved by granting a guard-
ianship to a relative, the Juvenile Code contemplates 
that relative placement under the court’s supervision 
may constitute a permanent placement. Th us, the stat-
ute provides: “If a child is under the care and supervi-
sion of the agency and is . . . placed with a relative and 
the placement is intended to be permanent . . . the 
court shall hold a review hearing not more than” every 
six months.31
Taken together with the court’s broad authority to 
amend or supplement its orders “within the authority 
granted to the court in section 18”32 of the Juvenile 
Code, the court has a great deal of fl exibility to craft a 
dispositional order that will both provide permanency 
to each child and consider the special circumstances of 
his or her particular case. In those cases in which none 
of these options are suitable, the court may need to 
proceed to hearing on a termination of parental rights 
petition. But, again, Judge Tacoma seems to misun-
derstand the law’s requirements. 
Section 19b(5) and Trejo
Judge Tacoma’s second major misstatement of the 
law involves his understanding of the purpose and 
methods of Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.19b(5)33 and 
the Michigan Supreme Court’s Trejo34 decision. His 
article repeatedly refers to these sources of law as creat-
ing a “statutory presumption requiring termination.” 
Th is is simply wrong. Th e court in Trejo repeatedly re-
jected the argument that subsection 19b(5) establishes 
a presumption in favor of termination. Th e majority 
explained:
reading subsection 19b(5) in its entirety, we 
conclude that subsection 19b(5) preserves to 
the court the opportunity to fi nd that termi-
nation is “clearly not in the child’s best inter-
ests” despite the establishment of one or more 
grounds for termination.
We reject Hall-Smith’s characterization of sub-
section 19b(5) as creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption. . . .35
Rather than create a presumption as Judge Tacoma 
asserts, the court elaborated on the purpose of sub-
section 19b(5), explaining that it “attempts to strike 
the diffi  cult balance between the policy favoring the 
preservation of the family unit and that of protecting a 
child’s right and need for security and permanency.”36 
Later in its opinion the court reiterated its conclusion 
that subsection 19b(5) creates no presumption: 
We conclude that . . . the subsection 19b(5)’s 
[sic] best interest provision, in fact, provides an 
opportunity for the court to fi nd that  termina-
tion is clearly not in the child’s best interest, de-
spite the establishment of one or more grounds 
for termination.37
A careful reading of the Trejo case demonstrates 
that while courts have less discretion today in deter-
mining not to terminate parental rights than they had 
before the 1994 addition of subsection 19b(5), they 
retain considerable discretion in making the fi nal deci-
sion whether to terminate parental rights.38 It must, of 
course, be remembered that before the enactment of 
subsection 19b(5), judges had the very sort of broad 
discretion for which Judge Tacoma again advocates. 
It was their failure to exercise that discretion wisely—
which led to vast numbers of children lingering in the 
impermanency of “temporary” foster care for years—
that caused the legislature to rein in their discretion. 
Th e judge relies on a related misunderstanding 
regarding subsection 19b(5). He asserts that the law 
currently shifts the burden to prove the child’s best 
interest to the parents or to the children who are the 
subject of a request for termination of parental rights. 
Th is, again, is a misreading of subsection 19b(5) as 
?Spring 2007
49
interpreted by the court in Trejo. Indeed, the court ex-
plicitly rejected the suggestion that subsection 19b(5) 
shifts the burden of proof to the parent or, by implica-
tion, to the child. Th e majority wrote:
we hold that under subsection 19b(5), the court 
may consider evidence introduced by any par-
ty when determining whether termination is 
clearly not in the child’s best interest. . . . Th us, 
we expressly reject the dicta of In re Boursaw, 
239 Mich. App. 161, 180 . . . (2000), that, “if 
the parent does not put forth any evidence ad-
dressing the issue [of the child’s best interests], 
termination is automatic.”39  
Later in its opinion, the court reemphasized this 
point: “Rather than imposing an impermissible 
burden on respondent, the best interest provision of 
subsection 19b(5) actually provides an opportunity to 
avoid termination, despite the establishment of one or 
more grounds for termination.”40
 Mandatory Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights 
Judge Tacoma asserts that a third provision of the 
law contributes to the excessive use of termination of 
parental rights, the mandatory fi ling provisions con-
tained in the Child Protection Law.41 While he rec-
ognizes that “in most cases the presence of the kinds 
of abuse or neglect enumerated in the statute justifi es 
and should require termination of parental rights,” he 
objects to the legislature’s removal of discretion “from 
professionals.”42 I will make two points in regard to 
this argument. 
First, the law does not remove discretion from 
“professionals.” Rather, it shifts discretion from 
child welfare professionals employed by the execu-
tive branch of government to the judicial branch. 
Nothing in the Child Protection Law or the Juvenile 
Code requires the court to terminate parental rights 
in response to a mandatory petition. Indeed, nothing 
in the law requires that the court even authorize such 
a petition or approve the request for termination of 
parental rights at the initial disposition. In many cases 
in which a mandatory termination petition is fi led, 
the protective services worker states at the prelimi-
nary hearing that he or she would not have made the 
request for termination but for the statutory mandate, 
and the court simply proceeds on the petition as 
though it requested temporary custody. 
Secondly, it is critical to recall why our Child 
Protection Law requires the state child welfare agency 
to fi le these mandatory petitions to terminate parental 
rights. Th e Binsfeld Commission’s report articulated 
numerous reasons why legislation mandating peti-
tions requesting termination of parental rights at the 
fi rst disposition was necessary.43 Among those were the 
lack of any mechanism within the agency to identify 
cases to which the reasonable eff orts were not neces-
sary,44 the agency routinely misapplied the reasonable 
eff orts required so that children were endangered,45 
a lack of access to legal counsel on the part of agency 
workers; a lack of training for both agency workers and 
prosecutors regarding when termination at an initial 
dispositional hearing is appropriate, and poor coordina-
tion between prosecutors and social workers resulted in 
improper preparation and presentation of cases. 
As a matter of public policy, it makes little sense 
to expend our very limited resources attempting to 
rehabilitate parents who rape, batter, torture, kill, or 
attempt to kill their children, for this is the very group 
of parents least likely to meaningfully benefi t from the 
application of human services.46 In those rare cases of 
this sort in which the parent may benefi t from those 
services, the court retains discretion to refrain from 
terminating parental rights. 
Having addressed the three provisions of the law 
that Judge Tacoma expresses concern about, I will next 
consider his suggested remedies.
Suggestions for Change
Judge Tacoma makes a number of suggestions for 
changes to the law to address what he has identifi ed 
as disconcerting. I agree with some of his suggestions; 
others are unwise. I will fi rst make a few general obser-
vations and will then address a number of the specifi c 
recommendations. 
It is important to recognize that no statute, policy, 
or practice will solve all the problems presented by 
child welfare practice. Even the seemingly simplest 
child welfare case is infi nitely complex because human 
emotions and relations, as the Judge suggests, are 
infi nitely complex. But it is important to recognize 
that every change will have consequences that we do 
not intend or that are predictable but undesirable. 
Th e admittedly excessive number of legal orphans in 
Michigan’s foster care system is one predictable but 
undesirable consequence. So we must make our policy 
choices wisely, understanding that there will always be 
cases that do not turn out as we would hope. 
Unlike Judge Tacoma, I believe that the statu-
tory structure of our child welfare system currently 
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provides suffi  cient discretion to judges to address this 
problem. Conversely, adopting the reforms Judge Ta-
coma advocates would predictably result in even larger 
numbers of children stuck in an unending “limbo” of 
the foster care system, “drifting” from placement to 
placement, rootless and with no hope of ever having a 
family connection. 
In his article, the judge relates a number of anec-
dotes to illustrate his concerns. In each case, he sug-
gests that termination of parental rights was not the 
answer. Perhaps he is correct in some of those specifi c 
cases; he certainly knows those cases much better 
than I. But in none of those cases does he suggest 
an outcome that would actually improve the child’s 
chance for a permanent family, that would ensure 
reunifi cation with a parent who is even minimally fi t 
to care for the child, or a standard that would result in 
an alternative permanent home for the child. In each 
illustration, the result of what he advocates would be a 
child stuck in the “limbo” of “temporary” foster care. 
Let me now comment on a number of the judge’s 
specifi c recommendations. 
The “One-Year Rule”
I have already addressed how the “one-year rule” 
really isn’t, but is instead a much longer period of time 
during which the child must wait for permanency 
and the parent must be provided services. I am deeply 
troubled by Judge Tacoma’s rationale for eliminating 
the rule. He writes:
Often the rule is implicated in cases where the 
child(ren) are the subject of neglect (such as a 
parent’s persistent, treatment resistant drug abuse 
or instability from transient meretricious rela-
tionships by a young mother so typical in these 
cases) rather than active abuse, in which the long 
term likelihood of building a successful family 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis.47
Th ere are two major fl aws in the judge’s reasoning. 
First, as a technical matter, nothing in the current law 
prohibits the court from considering those circum-
stances in a given case, so a change in the law is un-
necessary. Indeed, at both the permanency planning 
hearing and at a termination of parental rights hearing 
these may be legitimate considerations. 
Second, and more concerning on a policy level, 
an utter lack of a statutory ending date for the ap-
plication of services aimed at reunifi cation is a pre-
scription for a return to the days of unending foster 
care “limbo.” I fi nd particularly concerning the two 
categories of cases the judge suggests illustrate the 
need for a policy change: recalcitrant substance abuse 
and parental immaturity. Th e fi rst of these may very 
well be a lifelong struggle for the parent, and if the 
problem is so severe that the state has stepped in to 
remove the parent’s children, it will almost always take 
years for the parent to establish sobriety and stability. 
Th e only prescription for the second is waiting while 
the parent matures and is able to function psychologi-
cally as a responsible adult, which, of course, may 
never happen. But as I’ve already said, children don’t 
wait in a state of suspended animation. Th ey grow and 
develop. For an adult, a year seems a short time, but a 
child’s sense of time is very diff erent, and a year may 
feel like an eternity to him or her. 
Beyond these concerns, Judge Tacoma makes a 
mistake that lawyers and judges often make—the at-
titude that “it’s just neglect” so we should give parents 
more time. Legal professionals almost routinely dis-
count the impact of neglect on children.48 But neglect 
is very often the most diffi  cult form of child maltreat-
ment to respond to. As the judge’s examples make 
clear, many diff erent parenting problems fall under 
the “neglect” rubric. A parent who is developmentally 
delayed, mentally ill, substance addicted, and has lived 
in a series of violent relationships and who cannot care 
for his or her child as a result is said to have “neglect-
ed” his or her child.49 Obviously, co-morbidity of this 
sort, which is very often present in cases of neglect, 
presents extreme challenges for treatment providers.50 
Moreover, because most parents who neglect their 
children were themselves neglected as children, they 
disproportionately consume limited public resources.51
More important than the diffi  culty of respond-
ing adequately to a parent who “neglects” her child is 
the impact of parental neglect on children. What we 
label “neglect” may have devastating consequences for 
children. First, more children die each year as a result 
of neglect than die as a result of abuse.52 Even when it 
doesn’t result in death, neglect may have devastating 
impacts on children’s development.53 For example, 
neglect may negatively impact a child’s brain develop-
ment and may cause delays in “cognitive, language 
and academic skills.”54 
Changing the 19b(5) “Presumption”
Judge Tacoma asserts that “the current presump-
tion insisting on termination if the statutory grounds 
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are proven should be reversed.”55 Because, in my view, 
the court retains the necessary authority to decline 
to terminate parental rights, I do not see a need to 
change the current statutory scheme as it was inter-
preted in Trejo. If the lawyers are doing their jobs 
properly—that is, zealously representing their cli-
ents—the court will be fully informed regarding the 
relevant issues in the case. 
In analyzing whether we should change subsection 
19b(5), it is important to understand what a child 
in such a case will have experienced by the time the 
case reaches this point in the proceeding. A child who 
sits on the threshold of termination of parental rights 
has already suff ered abuse, or, more likely, long-term, 
serious neglect at the hands of his or her parent. Th at 
parent and child should typically have received in-
home services in the form of Family First, or a related 
program, to preserve the family before a petition is 
fi led with the court.56 After a petition is fi led, the par-
ent will have admitted or the court will have found, 
through the application of procedures meeting due 
process standards, that the parent was in fact abusive 
or neglectful. Th e court and agencies will have ex-
pended at least a year attempting to redress the issues 
that brought the child to the court’s attention. 
At this posture in the case, when parental unfi t-
ness has been demonstrated and parental inability or 
unwillingness to engage in a serious way in services 
aimed at rehabilitation, adding an affi  rmative best 
interest element to the petitioner’s burden will not 
improve the quality of judicial decision-making for 
the child. Moreover, such an added element, with-
out regard to whatever specifi c best interest factors 
the legislature or appellate courts might require be 
examined, will ultimately not remove the subjective 
nature of the decision. As Trejo makes clear—and as is 
equally clear under the Child Custody Act best inter-
est scheme—the fi nal decision on best interests will be 
subjective. Giving judges the ability to postpone the 
crucial decisions to be made will end up hurting more 
children than it helps 
What we should glean from our experience in 
child welfare over the past three decades is that 1) it is 
diffi  cult for people to change, and 2) the Department 
of Human Services and courts make poor parents. 
At the same time, children need stability and, to 
the extent possible, a single set of caregivers. Th us, 
children will generally be best served if their parents 
are provided a time-limited opportunity to regain 
custody of them, and when that time expires, a judge 
is required to make a series of very diffi  cult decisions 
about that child’s future. Changing the law so that 
judges can delay making these very diffi  cult decisions 
will take the pressure off  judges. But it will not serve 
the interests of the largest number of children who 
are in the foster care system. Adding an affi  rmative 
best-interest element to the burden on the petitioner 
will predictably result in many more children spend-
ing years marking time in the foster care system while 
their parents continue to be incapable of caring for 
them. Many of the children so affl  icted will become 
unadoptable or ineligible for another permanent 
resolution of their situation because they’ve waited too 
long for permanency. 
Expand Alternatives
By this point, it should be obvious that Judge 
Tacoma and I view these matters very diff erently, so 
it is gratifying to fi nd common ground. I wholeheart-
edly agree that we should constantly endeavor to fi nd 
programs and processes that produce better outcomes 
for children and families. Th e Permanency Planning 
Mediation Pilot program is one such program.57 
Other helpful programs include family-group deci-
sion-making, and team decision-making meetings 
now employed by the Department of Human Ser-
vices. Additionally, a bill currently pending before the 
legislature could establish another useful option in 
that it would provide for fi nancial assistance to a rela-
tive who becomes a child’s guardian.58 Illinois has, for 
several years pursuant to a Title IV-E waiver, provided 
for permanent, subsidized guardianship for a child in 
the foster care system for whom the court has deter-
mined that adoption is not an available option.59
Best Interest Factors
Judge Tacoma asserts the need for a listing of best 
interest factors similar to those applicable under the 
Child Custody Act and to guardianship proceed-
ings. He would prefer that the legislature or appellate 
courts instruct the judges of this state what factors are 
relevant to the best interest determination; I believe 
the determination of what is relevant to the child’s 
best interests in a particular case should be left to the 
individual judge and made on a case-by-case basis. 
Lawyers and judges should receive training regarding 
the complexity of the best interest determination in 
the context of child protective proceedings. Th at train-
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ing should include, at a minimum, information about 
the normal course of child development and a child’s 
various needs at each stage in the process, information 
about the confounding and counterintuitive nature of 
children’s behavior in the child welfare context,60 and 
information about the need for interdisciplinary col-
laboration in determining what legal outcomes would 
best serve a particular child’s interests. In addition to 
this overarching criticism of the need for a set of ar-
ticulated best interest factors, I have both general and 
specifi c concerns about the use of best interest factors 
in child protection cases.
In general, I do not see the need for a list of factors 
to be established by either the legislature or appellate 
courts when a trial court may look to the “whole re-
cord” in determining what will best serve a particular 
child. One concern is that if a judge fails to articulate 
a rationale regarding one such factor, appellate courts 
will reverse or remand cases to the trial court to give 
them the opportunity to address the factor.61 While 
the Child Custody Act has contained a list of best 
interest factors for decades, trial courts from time-to-
time still simply fail to address the factors.62 In a child 
protection case in which the child resides in tem-
porary care with no viable parent, such an outcome 
would further delay the child’s search for a permanent 
and stable family and would be seriously damaging 
to the child. Moreover, having a set of factors that 
trial courts must address does nothing to ensure that 
judges will actually exercise their discretion wisely.63 
In several places in this article I take issue with Judge 
Tacoma’s interpretation of facts as they relate to a 
child’s best interests. No set of best interest factors will 
prepare a judge to confront the sometimes bewilder-
ing behavior of abused and neglected children—the 
horribly abused child who professes undying love and 
commitment to his abuser, the sexually abused child 
who runs joyfully into the arms of the perpetrator. 
Having registered general objections to the estab-
lishment of a list of factors, for the most part I think 
that Judge Tacoma’s list of proposed factors are rel-
evant and should typically be addressed by counsel for 
each of the parties to a termination of parental rights 
petition and by the court. I will very briefl y address 
each of his proposed factors. 
The Age of the Child
First, regarding the age of the child, I fully agree 
that the age of the child should be considered in every 
termination proceeding. Nothing in the current law 
prohibits the court from doing so. I disagree that a 
child who is 14 years of age or older should be permit-
ted to veto a termination request as Judge Tacoma 
advocates. I fi nd his reference to the common law’s 
infancy rule in criminal cases entirely unpersuasive in 
this context. I do agree that the expressed desires of 
an older, and presumably more mature, minor should 
be carefully considered, not least because under our 
Adoption Code a child over 14 years of age must 
consent to be adopted.64 I leave room, however, for 
the possibility that termination of parental rights may 
serve the interests of an older youth even if he or she 
does not wish to be adopted. I have been involved in 
cases, for instance, in which mental health professional 
have testifi ed that termination is necessary, even when 
the child does not want such a result, to permit the 
child to make progress psychologically. While these 
cases are admittedly rare, it is certainly not rare that 
adolescents cannot know what is best for them.
The Child’s Attitude Toward Termination
Judge Tacoma’s second factor would be the child’s 
attitude toward termination. Again, as a general mat-
ter, I agree. Children’s expressed wishes should be 
taken into consideration.65 Where I part company 
with Judge Tacoma is the weight to be accorded the 
statements of young children and how children’s be-
havior and statements should be interpreted. In argu-
ing for this factor, Judge Tacoma cites a case in which 
an 8-year-old child threatened to sabotage adoption 
and to physically harm the judge by shooting him 
and cutting his throat for terminating the rights of 
the parent.66 Judge Tacoma concludes that this boy’s 
reaction is evidence that termination of parental rights 
was the wrong decision for the boy. But in my view, 
this case does not illustrate why the case should not 
have resulted in termination of parental rights. Rather, 
it in fact supports the court’s termination decision. 
Moreover, it illustrates how weighing children’s state-
ments—and related behavior—about termination 
can be confounding and contrary to their own best 
interests. Children who have been abused and neglect-
ed for years—the boy to which Judge Tacoma refers 
was seven at the time he came to the court’s attention 
and eight at the time of termination—can learn to 
model the parent’s unacceptable behavior and/or form 
traumatic bonds with their abusive or neglectful par-
ents. As Dr. Judith Cohen and Anthony Mannarion, 
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Ph.D., leading researchers on the impact of trauma on 
children have recently explained:
Modeling occurs when children who grow up 
in abusive or violent homes and communities 
have many opportunities to observe and learn 
maladaptive behaviors and coping strategies. 
Th ey may also see those behaviors being re-
warded repeatedly. For example, a child who ex-
periences physical abuse and domestic violence 
may erroneously conclude that anger and abuse 
are accepted ways of coping with frustration. 67
Similarly, the fact that a child has a strong attach-
ment to an abusive parent does not mean that that 
attachment is healthy or that termination of parental 
rights would not serve the child’s long-term interests. 
Again, Drs. Cohen and Mannarino explain:
Traumatic bonding involves both modeling of 
inappropriate behaviors and maladaptive at-
tachment dynamics. It also involves acceptance 
of inaccurate explanations for inappropriate be-
haviors. It has been described in the psychoana-
lytic literature as identifi cation with the aggres-
sor and in law enforcement as  the Stockholm 
syndrome. . . . Such children may bond with 
the violent parent out of self-preservation. To 
manage the guilt and cognitive dissonance as-
sociated with turning against the victimized 
parent, these children may adopt the violent 
parent’s views, attitudes, and behaviors to-
ward the victimized parent and become abu-
sive or violent themselves. 68
Obviously, I am not a mental health professional 
and no credible mental health professional would 
suggest that these dynamics are at work in the case the 
judge uses to illustrate his point without a comprehen-
sive evaluation. My point is this: children’s reactions to 
those who step in to help them overcome the damage 
done by their abusive and neglectful life experiences 
can be diffi  cult to understand and counterintuitive. 
Lawyers and judges should always seek the advice of 
competent mental health professionals when seeking 
to understand children’s behavior and statements in 
context.
The Type and Extent of Abuse or Neglect
Obviously, this should be considered. Again, noth-
ing in current law prohibits the court from consider-
ing it as part of “the whole record.”69 Th e case that 
Judge Tacoma posits to illustrate the need to ensconce 
this factor into law involves a young mother who 
cannot maintain a home that is physically minimally 
suitable or who lacks the ability to leave a “pernicious” 
companion. Th at is, he laments the need to terminate 
parental rights where a parent is merely neglectful. 
As I have discussed earlier, in such a case, the mother 
would have already been provided both in-home 
services to prevent the need for removal and a year’s 
worth of services to address her problems in function-
ing after the child entered foster care. I have already 
addressed the devastating consequences that can fl ow 
from this sort of neglect. Reasonable questions would 
be, “If this mother cannot maintain a clean house or 
leave an abusive boyfriend, how is she going to be 
even minimally successful at raising this child in a 
reasonably healthy way? If she can’t do it now, when 
will she be able to? How long must her children wait 
for her to become more responsible? Will she ever?” 
Probability that the Child Will Be Adopted
 Th e clinic in which I work was recently involved 
in a termination case, fi led because the court ordered 
the petition at the conclusion of the permanency plan-
ning hearing, in which the children were 14 and 15 
years old. Th e 14-year-old girl had behavioral prob-
lems that resulted in her placement in a residential 
treatment facility. Similarly, her 15-year-old brother 
was residing in a residential sex off ender treatment 
program. Th e only viable parent was a father who had 
been mostly absent for the children’s entire lives but 
expressed an interest in continuing to work toward 
regaining custody of his children. Th e girl had repeat-
edly indicated she did not want to see her father, but 
a mental health expert explained that she had been 
abandoned by everyone who should have loved and 
cared for her, and her rejection of her father before he 
could fully reject her was a means of protecting herself 
from the pain of yet another outright rejection. After 
hearing the evidence, the judge wisely determined 
that termination was clearly not in the children’s best 
interests, in part because the children had no viable 
hope for adoption.
I fully believe the court made the correct decision 
in this case. Obviously, the court did so under the 
current regime governed by subsection 19b(5) and 
Trejo. In such a case, it is critical for the lawyers to do 
their jobs: investigate the case fully, develop a coher-
ent theory of the case, present testimony to support 
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the theory of the case, and make the most compelling 
argument for the position taken. But when the court 
is not satisfi ed that the lawyers have done so, family 
court judges should not hesitate to use their extraordi-
nary authority to fully develop the facts of the case to 
make a fully informed decision.70 
Economic Factors
While the case Judge Tacoma uses to illustrate his 
perceived need for this factor is an aberration, I don’t 
necessarily disagree with his suggestion that economic 
impacts of termination on the children should be 
considered. Current law permits this. I would cau-
tion practitioners to consider this factor very carefully 
for two reasons. First, in the vast majority of cases, 
children will be better off  fi nancially if their natural 
parents’ rights are terminated and they are adopted. 
We should not ignore the fact that in most situations, 
the children we remove come from poor families and 
are placed with more middle-class families. Also, most 
children who are adopted from the foster care system 
are eligible for an adoption subsidy. A related question 
is, “Who pays?” When a child is adopted and receives 
both a support and medical subsidy, it is still cheaper 
for the state than maintaining a child in temporary 
foster care, so the state will typically benefi t economi-
cally when a parent’s rights are terminated and the 
child adopted. Th ese factors taken together may sug-
gest a fi nancial reason to favor termination. 
My second concern has to do with the potential 
distorting impact of economic considerations on 
judicial decision-making. Some years ago, before the 
existence of subsection 19b(5), while working for a 
legal aid offi  ce in Detroit, I was involved in a case 
in which I represented a 10-year-old girl. Th e girl’s 
mother suff ered from long-standing and severe mental 
health problems that were exacerbated by an addic-
tion to drugs. Th e girl’s grandfather had established 
a $30,000 trust fund for her that became eff ective 
upon his death. Th e court refused to terminate the 
mother’s rights—the girl had no legal father—despite 
the passage of nearly three years and the fi ling of two 
termination petitions. When I left the job with legal 
aid, the child was still a temporary ward with no real-
istic hope to return to her mother, no hope of a new, 
permanent family, not because she was unadoptable 
(her foster parents wished to adopt), but because the 
court would not terminate parental rights and extin-
guish the child’s rights to the trust fund. I don’t know 
if or how the case was resolved. I do know this: that 
$30,000, if she ever got it, cost that child a lot.
 
Some Recommendations
Having disagreed with Judge Tacoma’s general 
thesis and many of his specifi c recommendations, I 
feel constrained to off er some suggestions that I think 
may address the problem of legal orphans, which, as 
I have said, I agree with Judge Tacoma, is a very real 
problem. While none of the suggestions I off er require 
changes in policy or statute, they do require substan-
tial changes in practice. 
First, we lawyers and judges handling child protec-
tion cases must educate ourselves in the very complex 
medical and social welfare issues that are presented by 
these cases. Th roughout this article, I have attempted 
to point out that these cases present complicated 
human reactions to very unusual circumstances. We 
must try to understand these issues so that we do not 
jump to conclusions that make common sense, but 
that are in fact wrong and potentially very damaging. 
Specifi cally, we must focus on the impact of 
complex trauma on children’s development. Most of 
the children entering the child welfare system have 
experienced more than a single traumatic event and 
more than one type of trauma (e.g., abuse, neglect, 
parental substance abuse, exposure to domestic vio-
lence between adults in the home), and we must try 
to understand the eff ects these multiple traumas have 
on the individual child.71 By educating ourselves as 
much as possible about these allied fi elds, we can 
learn to ask the right questions and to know when 
we should bring in other professionals to assist us in 
our decision-making.
No matter how hard we work to understand the 
intricate nature of the harm done to children by abuse 
and neglect, we cannot hope to know in depth all the 
medical and social welfare issues that even a relatively 
straightforward case of child maltreatment presents. 
So, my second suggestion is that communities de-
velop and use trauma-informed multidisciplinary 
teams (MDTs) to assess cases of child maltreatment.72 
Michigan’s Child Protection Law has long required the 
use of MDTs by the Department of Human Services, 
but they are rarely used in practice.73 For this reason, 
courts should take the lead in their communities in 
developing these teams and insisting on their use. 
MDTs bring together professionals from a num-
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ber of disciplines—e.g, medicine, law, social work, 
psychology, psychiatry, education, and occupational 
therapy—into a single body, which provides a multi-
tude of perspectives on a particular case. Th eir use can 
insulate decision-making from bias or prejudice and 
can suggest new or diff erent service needs presented 
by a particular case. MDTs can assist courts in case 
decision-making. MDTs should be used early in the 
handling of cases (before the court becomes involved 
or immediately upon the fi ling of a petition) and at 
crucial decision-making points such as permanency 
planning hearings. A recent study—conducted at the 
Family Assessment Clinic at the University of Michi-
gan School of Social Work—of the use of an MDT as 
soon as protective services got involved in cases pro-
vides encouraging evidence that early application of 
MDT services can keep children safely in their homes 
longer and can help with expediting return of children 
to their homes when removal is necessary.74 
My third recommendation dovetails with my 
second, and is not inconsistent with my next two 
recommendations, although on fi rst impression that 
may seem to be the case. When any petition is fi led, 
all dispositional options should be on the table. If we 
have conducted the sort of comprehensive evaluations 
I have advocated for in recommendation number 2, 
and conducted them early in CPS’s contact with the 
family, the result should be a greater application of 
services to the family before the case is brought to the 
court, and more eff ort to maintain the family unit. 
Once a petition is fi led, we should seriously ques-
tion the parents’ ability and willingness to use services 
and to benefi t from them. I fi rmly believe that some 
parents—many more than we are probably willing to 
admit—simply cannot be habilitated or rehabilitated 
in anything like a timeframe to meet the needs of 
their children. But their children are our paramount 
concern. Th us, in some substantial number of cases, if 
we have comprehensive, early, multidisciplinary evalu-
ations, we will learn that regardless of what services 
we off er, we will not see the change necessary to safely 
reunify the family. In those cases, we should focus ex-
clusively on the needs of the children for permanency 
and should use the provisions of Michigan law that 
allow termination of parental rights (or other perma-
nency options) at the fi st dispositional hearing.75 
Too often we engage in a year(s)-long, empty 
exercise of off ering services to families that, if we were 
honest with ourselves, we would recognize either 
cannot or will not benefi t from those services. Th is 
wastes our very limited resources and deprives families 
that could benefi t from more intensive application of 
professional attention. Th is helps nobody and actively 
hurts some children. While we go through the steps of 
providing services to parents we can reasonably predict 
will not benefi t from them, their children grow older, 
develop more problems from the instability of foster 
care, and too many become unadoptable in the process. 
Fourth, the time to think seriously about the 
consequences of subsection 19b(5), Trejo, and the 
one-year permanency planning rule is not at the time 
of the permanency planning hearing or the time the 
termination petition is fi led, but at the time the peti-
tion seeking temporary jurisdiction is fi led, and at 
every hearing following the fi ling.
Preliminary hearings have too often become pro 
forma proceedings the results of which are a foregone 
conclusion. Th ey are too often seen as an opportu-
nity to see that the correct boxes on a form order are 
checked to ensure that federal dollars continue to 
fl ow into our child welfare system. Th is is not their 
purpose. At the preliminary hearing, we should be 
thinking very carefully about the case before the court. 
Th e court should be demanding at these hearings that 
the agency fi ling the petition be able to explain what 
“reasonable eff orts” were made to prevent the removal 
of the children from the home. We should think care-
fully about whether removal from the parent’s home 
is really necessary, and should also take more seriously 
the question whether custody of the child by the par-
ent is truly “contrary to the welfare” of the child.76 
“What is the permanency plan for the children who 
are the subject of the petition?” is a question we—and 
the court—should ask at every preliminary hearing. 
When reunifi cation is the articulated goal, the court 
should carefully scrutinize the treatment plan and 
reject the sort of boilerplate treatment plans that are so 
prevalent. Are there services that could keep the child 
safely in the home? Can the court render the child’s 
home safe by ordering the off ending person from the 
home?77 In short, courts should focus more closely 
on whether reasonable eff orts have in fact been made 
before determining that children should be removed.
Finally, courts should consider whether asserting 
jurisdiction over children but maintaining them in 
their family home subject to “reasonable terms and 
conditions” is the best option in a particular case.78 
Similarly, in some cases it may make sense to return 
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children to their parents’ custody knowing that the 
family will continue under court supervision for an 
extended period of time.79 In short, lawyers, courts, 
caseworkers, and agencies must get more creative at 
crafting dispositions that will keep children safe, will 
nurture their well-being, and which will seek to rely 
less refl exively on out-of-home care. 
Conclusion
Judge Kenneth Tacoma has identifi ed a real prob-
lem of current child welfare practice in Michigan. Th e 
excessive number of legal orphans. His prescription, 
however, runs the very real risk of causing even more 
severe problems for a larger number of children in the 
foster care system, a return to the never-ending road 
of foster care “limbo” and foster care “drift.” While 
our current statutory structure is far from perfect, 
every change in it will inevitably have unexpected 
consequences and predictable but unfortunate conse-
quences for the young people it is designed to serve. 
Although imperfect, Michigan’s current law provides 
practicing judges and lawyers enough fl exibility to 
craft a response to each case that can meet the needs 
of the children who come to the court’s attention. 
Developing such case-specifi c planning will require 
leadership by courts and a refocusing of the use of our 
resources. To best serve children and families, we must 
use all of the tools aff orded us in the relevant statutes 
and court rules, and we must train lawyers and judges 
to use the right tool at the right time. ?
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